Mitigate the risk of insecure passwords - we give you Get-bADpasswords

A common approach to gaining access into an Active Directory environment is to crack the password of a specific target user through means of brute-force or dictionary attacks. Built-in password policies for Active Directory can reduce the success rate of brute-force or dictionary attacks and will often prohibit access to accounts with too many failed login attempts.

AppLocker - hash *bad*listing

Application whitelisting is one of those actions on organization's security roadmaps, which either never happens or is adopted to fit the current environment rather than having it implemented to its full extent. Although far from perfect, with a large number of bypasses for its whitelisting capabilities (described in the Github repository here), AppLocker is still a great, free* tool which introduces resilience in the environment. Many of the bypasses rely on abusing Microsoft signed executables, as they are whitelisted by default and have the capability to launch other executables. In the previously linked Github repository, the author has made an effort to provide AppLocker rules to prevent the bypasses, however, many of these are likely to break things in a fully-functional real-world environment with "legacy" systems.

Routed SQL Injection

I encountered what is known as Routed SQL Injection a couple of times but it was never required to exploit the vulnerability to the full extent. Recently, I discovered an online challenge on the topic and decided to look at it in depth. An explanation of the vulnerability with a vulnerability code which is described in the beginning this post, can be found here.

Privilege escalation in IBM Notes Diagnostics #6

This is the fifth blog post in a series documenting various bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy.

In these blog posts I tend to be a bit verbose and give some insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom.

Client side code execution in IBM Notes

This is the sixth blog post in a series documenting various bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy.

In these blog posts I tend to be a bit verbose and give some insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom.

Privilege Escalation in Heimdal #2

This blog post highlights bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy.

In these blog posts I tend to be a bit verbose and give some insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom.

Privilege Escalation in Heimdal #1

This blog post highlights bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy.

In these blog posts I tend to be a bit verbose and give some insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom.

Privilege Escalation in IBM Notes Diagnostics #3-5

This is the fourth blog post in a series documenting various bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy.

In these blog posts I tend to be a bit verbose and give some insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom

Privilege Escalation in IBM Notes Smart Update Service

This is the third blog post in a series documenting various bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy

In these blog posts I tend to be a bit verbose and give some insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom.

Privilege Escalation in IBM Notes Diagnostics #2

This is the second blog post in a series documenting various bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy

In this blog post I will tend to be a bit verbose and give some insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom.

Privilege Escalation in IBM Notes Diagnostics #1

This is the first blog post in a series documenting various bugs found in installed software during customer engagements. Vulnerabilities will be published, when the vendor has provided fixes, or our deadline for the vendor to take action expires. This process is aligned with the Improsec Responsible Disclosure Policy

In these blog posts I will be a bit verbose and give insights into the process. Concrete exploitation steps and code is listed at the bottom.

Data Only Attacks Are Still Alive

The past week I have been fortunate enough to present at both Black Hat USA and DEF CON. My topic was on leveraging Write-What-Where vulnerabilities for Windows 10 Creators Update. You can find the slides here. In my DEFCON talk I mentioned additional KASLR bypasses, one of those use the field Win32ThreadInfo from the TEB to leak a pointer to ntoskrnl.exe. This pointer can be used to achieve arbitrary kernel mode code execution as explained in my presentation.

A couple of months ago I did a blogpost on data only attacks in kernel exploitation, which you can find here. I used the tagWND object to locate the EPROCESS of the current thread, while that technique is still perfectly valid, I wanted to present another way of doing it which does not involve creating a tagWND object.

The enterprise-ready workaround I would have expected from IBM

When IBM promised to release a workaround for the vulnerability we found in their product, I truly expected such a widely respected company to release an enterprise-ready workaround, and not just a manual approach to setting registry permissions in the GUI.

How we found a vulnerability in IBM's backup product - the workaround and a bit about the Responsible Disclosure process

A few months back, my good friend Flemming Riis and I found a fundamental security vulnerability in the IBM Tivoli Storage Manager (TSM) client, while researching IBM TSM’s handling of authentication ("Node ID" and "Node Password") and unsafe implementations of TSM, which we covered in a few blogposts  Backdoors and data compromise via Backup Systems (in danish only) and Protecting your secrets.

We couldn't believe our own eyes when we, in very little time, found a pretty important – and incredibly trivial – security vulnerability in the TSM product.

We then initiated a Responsible Disclosure process with the IBM Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT), which I will describe further below, as it illustrates how important it is for researchers to set requirements and insist on deadlines being met.

Back to Basics or Bypassing Control Flow Guard with Structured Exception Handler

This blog post was a submission to Microsoft Bypass Bug Bounty program, but was not eligible to the scope of the program. Thus I am releasing a blog post on the technique which is based on leaking the stack address and overwriting the structured exception handler, thus turning a use-after-free into a structured exception handler overwrite.

To facilitate this bypass, I have again chosen to use vulnerability for Internet Explorer 11 which was patched in MS16-063 in June of 2016 and written about by the company Theori and I’ve previously used in CFG bypass posts here and here.

Windows Kernel Shellcode on Windows 10 – Part 4 - There is No Code

This blog post is an addendum to the three blog posts about Windows kernel shellcode I posted based on the techniques by Cesar Cerrudo. You can find the previous blog posts here, here and here.

An assumption in my previous blog posts was the ability to execute arbitrary assembly code in kernel context. While it is possible to obtain this from a write-what-where vulnerability condition and often from a pool overflow, it does require both a kernel read/write primitive and a KASLR bypass to some kernel driver. If we limit ourselves to using the read/write primitive to perform a data only attack, we can omit the KASLR bypass. This blog post describes how each of the three methods can be converted to a data only attack instead of an actual shellcode.

Windows Kernel Shellcode on Windows 10 – Part 2

This blog post is the second in the series on Windows kernel shellcode and picks up the nulling out ACLs method described by Cesar Cerrudo at Black Hat in 2012. You can find part 1 here.

The same assumptions as in the previous blog post apply here, that being the exploit has gained arbitrary kernel mode code execution and we can handcraft the assembly code to run. I see the ACL NULL technique used almost as much as the token replacement one. The idea is to locate the SecurityDescriptor, or in effect the ACL, of a privileges process and replace it with NULL. This value tells Windows that no permissions have been assigned for the process and hence everyone has full access to it. In Windows 10 Anniversary a mitigation for this has been implemented as noted by Nettitude Labs

Windows Kernel Shellcode on Windows 10 – Part 1

When creating Windows kernel exploits the goal is often to somehow gain higher privileges, often SYSTEM. This part of the exploit writing is normally the very last part, and often not very discussed since so many steps come before it. The most common ways I’ve seen that done is either by stealing a process token of a privileged process or by removing the ACL of a privileged process. In essence the techniques I normally come across and use myself are derived and often referenced from the Black Hat presentation by Cesar Cerrudo in 2012. It is a great presentation and white paper and should definitely be read. There are however two issues when trying to use the methods from the white paper; firstly, it does not supply the actual shellcode only the technique in theory and secondly it was written prior to the release of Windows 8.1 much less Windows 10.

Bagdøre og datakompromittering via backupsystemer

Sammen med min gode ven og kollega, Flemming Riis, har jeg på det seneste undersøgt opsætningen af nogle udbredte backupsystemer, herunder hvordan de potentielt kan misbruges af angribere.

Tanken er ikke at »male fanden på væggen«, men at gøre opmærksom på en reel problemstilling, som i følge vores erfaring er noget overset.

 

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